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THE LOSS OF PRIVACY IS JUST A HEARTBEAT AWAY:
AN EXPLORATION OF GOVERNMENT HEARTBEAT
DETECTION TECHNOLOGY AND ITS IMPACT ON FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
George M. Dery III*
The Department of Energy has developed the "Enclosed Space Detection
System" (ESDS), a search tool that enables officials to identify persons hidden inside
vehicles at certain sensitive sites, such as nuclear facilities. ESDS operates by
measuring the movements in vehicles generated by the beating of an occupant's
heart.
This Article considers the Fourth Amendment privacy implications caused by the
advent of a technology so advanced that it can probe all the way to one's heart.
Specifically, this Article critically examines the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment
precedent concerning the definition of a "search" and the application of the
"special needs" doctrine to assess the impact of the heartbeat detector on privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory has determined that a "highly trained
terrorist" could evade a vehicle search and thus sneak inside a nuclear weapons
plant.' According to United States agents, the following methods have foiled
"cursory" physical searches of vehicles crossing at international borders: the
concealment of illegal aliens behind vehicle dashboards; the wrapping of bodies
around engines; and the use of humans as replacement for seat stuffing.2 Four
prisoners using a similar tactic "literally drove out the front gate" of Tennessee's
Riverbed Maximum Security Institution, a prison holding some of the state's
"toughest criminals."' These dangers, which implicate concerns as diverse as the
security of the nuclear arsenal of the United States, the protection of the nation's
" Associate Professor, California State University Fullerton, Division of Political Science
and Criminal Justice; Former Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California; J.D., Loyola
Law School, Los Angeles, California, 1987; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles,
1983.
Stephen W. Kercel et al., Comparison of Enclosed Space Detection System With
Conventional Methods, Presentation Before the 13th Annual Security Technology
Symposium, Virginia Beach, Virginia (June 9-12, 1997), at 2.
2 See id.
3 The Tell-Tale Heart: Detector Picks Up Heartbeat of Hidden Humans (posted Jan. 29,
1997) <http://www.cnn.com/TECH/9701/29/tt/tell.tale.heart/index.html>.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
borders from illegal immigration, and the safety of the citizenry from escaped
convicts, take advantage of the same blind spot in law enforcement surveillance: the
government's inability to detect the presence of a person or persons in enclosed
vehicles. However, a new technology, originally developed for the Department of
Energy, may plug this'hole in security.4
This technological advance, called the Enclosed Space Detection System
("ESDS") and also known as the "Heartbeat Detector", 5 is so potentially significant
that it has earned an award which its developer deemed "essentially... the Nobel
Prize of inventions."6 In fact, this device is so revolutionary that "no member of the
ESDS development team has ever been made aware of an electronic device similar
to ESDS."7 The heartbeat detector's precision remains unmatched, having a
"repeatable and reproducible reliability in excess of 99%. ''8 Although extremely
powerful, this new surveillance tool is quite simple to use and relatively inexpensive
to operate.9 Such simplicity and low cost could position the heartbeat detector for
common use in any situation in which law enforcement harbors fears of persons
concealing themselves in vehicles.
The very potency and versatility of this surveillance technology raises troubling
Fourth Amendment concerns. A device which delves literally all the way to a
person's heart without necessitating a physical search may require reconsideration
of the United States Supreme Court's definition of a Fourth Amendment search. The
development of the heartbeat detector may signal a significant expansion in the scope
of the "special needs" exception to the traditional Fourth Amendment mandates of
a warrant and probable cause. Finally, consideration of the ESDS may alter Supreme
Court precedent regarding severe bodily intrusions by the government.
This Article examines the potential impact the heartbeat detector may have on
Fourth Amendment mainstays. It begins, in Part II, with a description of the abilities
of ESDS and an exploration of the circumstances in which this system may be
employed. Part III presents a historical background of the Fourth Amendment
doctrines that this new technology may touch. Finally, Part IV examines the
implications the heartbeat detector may have in light of Supreme Court precedent.
4 See Kercel et al., supra note 1, at 2.
See OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, ENCLOSED SPACE DETECTION SYSTEM I
(unpublished handout, on file with the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal). The system
also has been called AVIAN (Advanced Vehicle Interrogation and Notification System). See
Just a Heartbeat Away, TECHBEAT (Nat'l Inst. of Justice, Nat'l Law Enforcement and
Corrections Tech. Ctr., Rockville, Md.), Oct. 1997, at 1.
6 Just a Heartbeat Away, supra note 5, at 2. See also Searching for Hidden Hearts, R&D
MAG., Sept. 1997, at 62.
7 OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 2.
1Id.
9 The Oak Ridge National Laboratory asserted: "Operation [of ESDS] does not require
specialized training." Kercel et al., supra note 1, at 1. Further, "the cost of ESDS is
approximately 3% of the cost of conventional methods." Id. at 9.
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II. THE NEW HEARTBEAT DETECTION TECHNOLOGY
A. The Development of the Heartbeat Detector
Nearly a century after the ratification of the Bill of Rights, an Englishman named
J.W. Gordon watched the jiggling readings of a sensitive scale upon which he was
standing and realized that a heartbeat's mechanical force was susceptible to
measurement. ° Still another century would pass, however, before this phenomenon
would be harnessed for law enforcement surveillance. On August 22, 1996,
investigators reported that the Department of Energy ("DOE"), prompted by security
concerns, began an effort called "Portal of the Future," which focused on the
prevention of terrorism, sabotage, and theft at sensitive sites around the nation. " The
heartbeat detector formed a "key component" of the Portal of the Future system. 12
The ESDS, or heartbeat detector, is a surveillance tool designed to detect the
presence of people "hiding in enclosed spaces of vehicles" by identifying the
presence of a "human ballistocardiogram."' 3 With each beat of the human heart, a
ballistocardiogram or a small mechanical shock wave propagates through the body.' 4
This shock wave, in turn, causes the entire vehicle holding the person to vibrate "at
a frequency dissimilar from any other source."' 5
The heart's ability to move an entire vehicle, even a big truck, 6 provides law
enforcement with a previously unavailable window through which to view the
contents of vehicles passing at various checkpoints. Officers can merely require
known occupants to turn off the engine and exit the vehicle.' 7 Then, such officers
temporarily can place "sensitive seismic geophones"' 8 on the "roof, bumper, or other
flat surface" of the vehicle.' When a heartbeat's vibrations move a weight
suspended in an electromagnetic field of a geophone, the reaction generates an
o See Stephen Strauss, Trends: Detecting Stowaways (last modified Jan. 1997)
<http://web.mit.edu/afs/athena/org/t/techreview/www/articles/jan97/trends.html>.
" See Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge's Portal of Future Putting Emphasis
on Security (last modified Aug. 22, 1996) <http://www.oml.gov/PressReleases/archive/
mr960822-00.html>.
12 See id.
Wavelet Applications-Advanced Methods Group, Enclosed Space Detection System
(ESDS) (visited Oct. 3, 1998) <http://www.ic.oml.gov/rd-groups/amg/esds.html>.
14 See id. See also OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 1.
'5 OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 1.
16 See Strauss, supra note 10 ("[A] beating heart can perturb a tractor-trailer's walls.").
'7 See Wavelet Applications-Advanced Methods Group, supra note 13.
18 OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 1. Geophones "are traditionally
used by geologists to hunt for seismic signatures that reveal underground pockets of
minerals." Strauss, supra note 16.
'9 Strauss, supra note 16.
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electrical signal.2" This signal then transmits to a computer that determines whether
a beating heart concealed within the vehicle caused the small vibrations."1
The researchers at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory have determined that the
human ballistocardiogram presents a particular pattern which features "several
distinctive harmonic peaks [which vary] from about 50 to 150 beats per minute. '22
This unique signature enabled Oak Ridge to devise an algorithm to isolate and
distinguish a beating heart from other signals. 3
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory considers this device virtually foolproof:
"Independent tests included deliberate attempts to spoof the device, including
wrapping a person in quilted comforters or placing a person in the middle of a ton of
garbage in a garbage truck. In every case, the ESDS was able to determine that a
person was present."24 Such performances have moved researchers to refer to success
rates rarely heard of in science: "The ESDS has proven to be 100% effective in
detecting persons hidden inside vehicles."25 Consistent achievements in detection of
the human heart have spurred developers to expand the reach of the heartbeat
detector. Since then, ESDS has detected the heartbeats of dogs, cats, and mice.26
This high level of sensitivity could open up a new application: detection of
"endangered animals being illegally smuggled into the United States."27
Even if law enforcement limits itself to locating people, the potential scope of
ESDS is impressive. A technology originally envisioned as a tool for safeguarding
nuclear facilities has gone beyond even the expanded uses at prisons and borders.
Indeed, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory loaned the heartbeat detector to the
Atlanta Police Department for use during the 1996 Olympic Games.2 To "encourage
the widespread application of this system," the developer licensed the relevant
software to GeoVox Security, Inc. to "develop and market a commercial version of
the Heartbeat Detector."' 9 The government, originally prompted by the DOE, thus
not only has created a technology that enables law enforcement in various
20 See Just a Heartbeat Away, supra note 5, at 2.
21 See id.
22 Strauss, supra note 16.
23 Id. ("Given these characteristics, [the Oak Ridge researchers] devised a detection
algorithm based on a common mathematical technique called wavelet analysis that is well
known for its ability to distinguish impulse signals, even those spaced irregularly.").
24 OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 1. Other materials used in these
tests included mattresses and bubble wrap. See Just a Heartbeat Away, supra note 5, at 2.
25 See Just a Heartbeat Away, supra note 5, at 2. Elsewhere, the success rate was stated
slightly more conservatively as "99%+." See Kercel et al., supra note 1, at 1.
26 See Just a Heartbeat Away, supra note 5, at 2. See also Government Showcases Spy-
Savvy Devices (posted Mar. 10, 1998) <http://cnn.com/TECH/science/9803/10/terrorism.
detectors/index.html>.
27 Just a Heartbeat Away, supra note 5, at 2.
28 See OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 1.
29 Id.
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jurisdictions throughout the country to eavesdrop upon a person's heart but,
ultimately, has given a means for private concerns to do so.
B. The Heartbeat Detector's Abilities in Relation to Current Search Methods
The true magnitude of this new surveillance power is understood best through
a comparison with alternative conventional methods for detection of individuals in
vehicles. Currently, "the only method widely used to detect passengers concealed in
vehicles is the [traditional] physical search."30 A thorough physical search of even
a "single fully loaded truck" requires thework of two to six people, over a period of
up to eight hours.3 ' Not only is this approach costly in terms of labor hours, it is not
foolproof, for both intruders and escapees have been known to foil these search
teams.32
A much more effective detection method is canine inspection which, under the
best circumstances, is "about 80% reliable" in discovering concealed persons.33
There are significant limits, however, constraining the widespread use of canines.
First, reliable security dogs are scarce.34 Each dog requires individual training in
"only one of four possiblejobs: drug detection, explosive detection, people detection,
and arson investigation."" Moreover, many hours are spent not only on training
dogs, but also on handling them. Identifying a dog's signal may necessitate
interpretation and judgment by a trained handler.36 Canine inspection thus requires
the expenditure of time on educating humans about working with dogs.
Further, canines have "limited duty cycle[s]." 37 Labradors, the dogs with the
most stamina, remain reliable "through a cycle of two hours on, one hour off,
repeated for several cycles per day."3 The reliability of other breeds, however, may
fade after only thirty minutes.39 The Oak Ridge National Laboratory estimates a
dog's usefulness, in the best of circumstances, at around six hours per day.4 0
30 Kercel et al., supra note 1, at 4.
31 See id
32 See id. See also The Tell-Tale Heart. Detector Picks Up Heartbeat of Hidden Humans,
supra note 3 (describing the escape of four inmates from a maximum security prison in
Tennessee).
31 OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 2.
34 See id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
" Id. However, Oak Ridge has been careful to note that dogs indded may be trained for
"multiple security tasks," yet it warns that the dogs, when they fail, "become equally
unreliable at all of them." Id. at 3. See also Kercel et al., supra note 1, at 4-5.
36 See OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 3.
37 Id.
38 Id.
31 See id
40 See id
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Finally, canines are relatively vulnerable to conclusions of false negatives. A dog
"provides no clear diagnostic for failure. If the dog catches a cold, it may show no
external symptoms, but its sense of smell' (and consequent level of reliability) may
be greatly diminished, and neither the dog nor the handler may be aware of it."'"
ESDS, freed from many of the restrictions placed on conventional searches,
stands in stark contrast to detection methods that rely on either humans or dogs.
First, use of the heartbeat detector requires little training: "Any person competent
enough to be a security guard can be trained to operate the system in an hour."42
Rather than necessitating the maintenance of an elite group of specialists, therefore,
ESDS is employable by "regular guards" who use the detector "in addition to" their
typical duties.43 Unlike the nuances of canine searches, the heartbeat detector
requires no special skill of judgment or interpretation, for it simply provides a
"SEARCH" or "PASS" flag." While dogs tire after a six-hour shift, ESDS is
available for use twenty-four hours per day.45 Finally, the heartbeat detector is
immune to the infirmities that can diminish a canine's effectiveness.46 ESDS thus
boasts a record of reliability at least nineteen percent more effective than the most
conventional method currently available, at a fraction (some three percent) of its
cost.
47
C. The Potential Uses of the Heartbeat Detector
1. Protection of Nuclear Facilities
Two kinds of nuclear facilities exist in the United States: nuclear weapons plants
controlled by the government, and power plants run by electric utility companies.48
The DOE originally developed ESDS for use at government weapons plants, which
might be attractive targets for terrorists. 49 The government was concerned that
knowledgeable and zealous terrorists could foil physical inspections and thus
precipitate a "criticality event" that could kill "hundreds of hostages."5 Meanwhile,
private nuclear plants faced their own vulnerabilities; a single eco-terrorist could
41 Id. (emphasis omitted).
42 Id. (emphasis added).
43 See Kercel et al., supra note 1, at 7.
44 See OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 3.
" See id.
46 See id.
41 Whereas canines are about 80% reliable, ESDS possesses "the consistently repeatable
99% reliability." Kercel et al., supra note 1, at 4. See id. at 7-9 for a full comparison of costs
between human, canine, and ESDS methods.
48 See OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 5-6.
41 See id.
'0 Id. at 6.
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cause a "serious release of radioactive contamination into the environment."'5' Thus,
with the hope of averting such disasters, ESDS is being deployed in this context.
52
2. Prevention of Escape from Prisons
After "informal discussions with prison authorities," the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory has estimated that "an average of one successful escape per year per
prison" occurs by inmates hiding in outgoing vehicles.53 Of course, such incidents
are quite costly in terms of public safety and security, as well as in terms of resources
actually spent on capture.54 Consequently, tests of ESDS are currently in progress
at several correctional institutions.5" Moreover, a heartbeat detector already has been
sold for use in the British prison system. 6
3. Controlling Illegal Immigration at International Border Crossings
The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") believes that
as many as nine out often attempts to smuggle illegal aliens through ports of entry
are successful.5 These attempts occur in spite of visual inspections by trained INS
agents, which may delay traffic up to three hours.58 Further, both agents and hidden
passengers face dangers from physical searches. 59 Again, ESDS offers a reliable,
51 Id.
52 The use of the heartbeat detector to protect nuclear facilities may become international.
The ESDS handout notes:
The curious reader may wonder if ESDS should not be employed in Russian
nuclear weapons facilities. It probably will in the near future. The US-DOE has
a program to assist the Russian government to upgrade its security of nuclear
facilities. Unfortunately, up to now the program has to deal with more basic
issues, such as obtaining locks that actually stay locked.
Id. at6.
SId. at 5.
5" GeoVox Security, Inc., the licensee of the ESDS system, estimated the cost of recovery
of inmates, even when found a few miles from prison, to be typically around $100,000. Id.
5 The Oak Ridge National Laboratory has noted:
ESDS is currently in long-term test and evaluation at several prisons, including
the Riverbend Maximum Security Institution in Nashville TN, and Centinela
State Prison in California. One unit has been sold commercially to the Police
Scientific Development Branch of the UK Home Office for use in the British
prison system.
Id. Further trials of ESDS are running at Pelican Bay Maximum Security Prison in California.
See Strauss, supra note 10.
56 See Kercel et al., supra note 1, at 3.
17 See OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 4.
58 See id.
SId. ( "There is risk to the agent as well as the concealed passenger. Inserting a hand into
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quick, and inexpensive solution.' The heartbeat detector has been put on display at
San Ysidro and Otay Mesa on California's border with Mexico.6
4. Protection at Airports
The developers of ESDS have identified another need for their system: protection
of airport sally ports from terrorist attack.62 These ports grant entry, without
inspection, to various support vehicles such as catering and fuel trucks.63 The Oak
Ridge National Laboratory considers such a port "literally an open door for terrorists
... [a] hidden terrorist could wait for the proper moment, slip out of the [support]
vehicle, sabotage an airplane, sneak into the same or another vehicle, exit the sally
port, and never be noticed." Once again, the ESDS developers offer the heartbeat
detector as a quick (two minute) and inexpensive way to avert such dangers."
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT FUNDAMENTALS
A. The Boundaries of Fourth Amendment Application
1. The Evolving Definition of a Fourth Amendment "Search" from a "Physical
Trespass onto a Constitutionally Protected Area" to a Government Intrusion on
a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment,' the Bill of Rights' bulwark against official invasions
of privacy and security, controls only the government abuse within its reach. Limited
by its own terms to apply only to "searches and seizures,"67 the Fourth Amendment
is powerless against any misconduct falling outside of the Court's definitions of
a concealed space might lead to contact with anything, a syringe, a venomous animal, or even
a body part.").
60 See id.
6 See id.
62 See id. at 7.
63 See id.
4 Id The Oak Ridge National Laboratory does not mince words regarding this danger:
"One is tempted to regard this as culpable stupidity on the part of the airport operators." Id.
65 See id
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Id.
67 i.
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search and seizure. The threshold question of Fourth Amendment application,
identifying which actions trigger a "search" or a "seizure," thus has become such an
important issue that it often is dispositive of the very outcome of a case.6"
At one time, the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment could be "measured [quite
literally] in fractions of inches."69 Such rigid clarity was due to the Court's definition
of a Fourth Amendment search as an actual physical "intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area."70 However, a series of cases, involving technological enhancement
of law enforcement's sensory perception, strained the precise "constitutionally
protected area" formulation to the breaking point.7 '
In Olmsteadv. United States,72 the United States Supreme Court reviewed a case
of first impression concerning the Fourth Amendment implications of government
wiretapping of "private telephone conversations. 73 In Olmstead, federal prohibition
agents gathered evidence of the defendants' bootlegging activities by tapping into
telephone lines leading from their private residences. 74 Because these taps were
"made in the streets near the houses" rather than within the homes themselves, the
Court deemed these intrusions as "made without trespass upon any property of the
defendants. 75 The intrusion without the physical trespass "did not amount to a
search ... within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.,
76
The Court adhered to its tangible "physical trespass" test in its next electronic
eavesdropping case, Goldman v. United States.77 In Goldman, federal agents,
suspecting the defendant of violating the Bankruptcy Act,7 placed a "detectaphone"
against the wall partitioning their room from the one in which the defendant was
making various incriminating statements.79 The detectaphone, foretelling the
sensitivity of Oak Ridge National Laboratory's heartbeat detector, was "so delicate"
that, "when placed against the... wall," it could pick up sound waves generated
68 For an example of the Court's finding of the lack of a Fourth Amendment search as
dispositive in a case, see California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-41 (1987). Further, the
failure to establish a "seizure" of the person was determinative in California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
69 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1960), in which the Court
attempted to respond to this charge, considered at the time as a criticism.
70 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512.
7' See, e.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928).
72 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
71 Id. at 455.
74 See id. at 456-57.
71 Id. at 457.
76 Id. at 466.
17 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
78 See id at 131.
79 See id. at 131-32.
1999]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
inside the next room.8" The Court, finding no physical trespass in connection with
the relevant interception, identified "no reasonable or logical distinction ... between
what federal agents did in the present case and state officers did in the Olmstead
case."'" Once again, because the government avoided crossing a physical boundary,
it successfully avoided Fourth Amendment limitations.
By 1960, cracks started to show in the "physical trespass" boundary line. In
Silverman v. United States,82 police investigating a gambling operation penetrated the
party wall of a home with a foot long "spike mike" until it came into contact with the
home's heating duct. 3 Police thus caused the duct to become a "giant microphone,
running though the entire house . ,,84 The Court deemed this eavesdropping
"accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises"85
and thus distinct from earlier decisions that lacked this "physical encroachment
within a constitutionally protected area."86 Even as the Court fully formulated the
physical trespass test it had been crafting for over three decades, it seemed cognizant
of the limitations of the test. The Court in Silverman recognized that, in previous
decisions, only a "closely divided Court '87 permitted electronic surveillance in cases
regarding "physical encroachment within a constitutionally protected area."88 The
Court in Silverman also noted criticisms that the physical intrusion standard
essentially trivialized constitutional rights as hinging upon the technicalities of
property boundaries.89
Thus, less than a decade after Silverman, the Court began to cast about for a new
search standard to address advancing surveillance technology. In 1967, a Mr. Katz,
while transmitting wagering information from a public telephone booth,' presented
the Court with an opportunity to update its measurement of Fourth Amendment
boundaries. In Katz v. United States, FBI agents placed "an electronic listening and
recording device [on] the outside" of the phone booth frequented by the defendant.9
To consider whether the government had committed a search of Katz's conversations,
the Court described any prior emphasis on property interests as "discredited"92 and
80 Id. at 131.
" Id. at 135.
82 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
83 See id. at 506, 509.
84 Id. at 509.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 510.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Seeid. at510,512.
90 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 353.
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reduced the phrase "constitutionally protected area" to an "incantation." 93 Indeed,
focusing upon whether a particular piece of geography is a "constitutionally
protected" area was "misleading," for it deflected the inquiry from the true problem.94
After all, noted the Court, the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. 95
With the Court in Katz expending its energies upon laying waste to the physical
trespass test, it fell to Justice Harlan to articulate a new definition of a Fourth
Amendment search: "My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective)'expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one
that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'" This "reasonable expectation
of privacy" test has become the accepted definition of a Fourth Amendment search
for the last three decades.97 Indeed, this formulation has become so standard that the
Court routinely applies it with minimal discussion.9" Therefore, the increasing power
and sophistication of surveillance technology has prompted the Court to reject
explicitly its concrete view of searches as physical intrusions of property boundaries
in favor of a test focusing on people's reasonable privacy expectations.
2. The Court Abandons the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Standard for
Canine Sniffs
At times, the Court has demonstrated a curious willingness to ignore its own
rules regarding the boundaries of a Fourth Amendment search. The decision in
United States v. Place99 offered one of the clearest examples of this selective
memory. In Place, the Court considered whether a canine's sniff of personal luggage
constituted a Fourth Amendment search."° After a brief mention of its well-
established "legitimate expectations of privacy" standard, the Court simply failed to
heed its prior dictate.'1 Instead of adhering to Katz's two-pronged inquiry regarding
9' Id. at 350.
94 See id. at 351.
95 Id.
96 Id at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
9' See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (finding a lower
expectation of privacy among student athletes); Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 617 (1989) (finding an expectation of privacy during urination); Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (finding no expectation of privacy for growing marijuana plants
visible from an airplane); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-46 (1979) (finding no expectation of privacy when dialing a
telephone).
98 See Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1301 (1997).
99 462 U.S. 696 (1982).
100 See id. at 706-07.
101 See id.
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an individual's actual and reasonable privacy expectations in the area or item
observed, 2 the Court merely contrasted a sniff of a "well-trained narcotics detection
dog" with a human officer's "rummaging through the contents of ... luggage."'0 3
The "manner" of a dog's "investigation technique" was "much less intrusive than a
typical search" for it did not require the actual opening of luggage and, therefore, did
not expose legitimately held items to public view. 4 Additionally, the dog's sniff
presented authorities with only "limited" information-whether narcotics were
present or absent from a particular set of baggage." 5 Police thus only learned about
the existence of drugs which, by their nature, were illegal to possess." 6 Finally, the
surgical precision of the canine sniff eliminated the "embarrassment and
inconvenience" entailed in a traditional luggage search. 7
All these considerations were true, yet irrelevant. According to the holding of
Katz and its progeny, the issue was whether a dog's sniff intruded upon an
expectation of privacy actually held by the possessor of the luggage and reasonably
held by society at large. Such an inquiry would have to involve a consideration of
whether one could expect that police could detect non-metallic items concealed in
opaque suitcases as people held or carried the bags in airports. The answer to this
query is clear: Neither police, nor anyone else, can determine the contents of closed
luggage. Indeed, that is the very reason authorities employ specially trained canines
in this context. Thus, dogs do intrude upon reasonable privacy expectations when
they sniff bags at airports. This intrusion exists regardless of whether police
physically are able to commit a more intrusive search by opening luggage.
Any damage done by the holding in Place to the reasonable expectation of
privacy test from Katz seemed contained at first, for the Court viewed canine sniffs
as so precise as to be sui generis.l° However, the targeted inquiry concept from
Place would surface in yet another case, United States v. Jacobsen."° In Jacobsen,
officers performed a field test on white powder to determine whether it was a
controlled substance."0 The Court echoed the finding in Place: "The governmental
conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably
'private' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.""' The holding of the two
cases crafted the following exception to the Katz definition of a search: If the
102 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
103 Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
104 Id.
1o5 See id.
106 The Court noted that the canine sniff "discloses only the presence or absence of
narcotics, a contraband item." Id
107 Id.
108 See id.
109 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
110 See id. at 113.
I Id. at 123.
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government's investigation techniques were so precise as to identify nothing but
illegally-possessed items, then the surveillance did not constitute a search and,
therefore, did not trigger application of the Fourth Amendment in the first place.
3. Judicial Backsliding from "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" to "Physical
Invasion" in Aerial Surveillance Cases
The Court has experienced difficulty in remaining faithful to its abstract notion
of reasonable expectation of privacy in the face of the simpler, more concrete concept
of physical invasion. In fact, in cases in which the Court has considered individual
privacy interests beyond the exterior walls of homes, the Justices actually have begun
to recognize constitutionally protected areas again. When considering whether police
entry on to large tracts of private land constituted a search, the Court in Oliver v.
United States"2 recognized that the Fourth Amendment extended beyond a person's
home to include "curtilage":
[C]urtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the Fourth
Amendment protections that attach to the home. At common law, the
curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with
the "sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,".., and therefore
has been considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment
purposes. Thus, courts have extended Fourth Amendment protection to
the curtilage; and they have defined the curtilage, as did the common law,
by reference to the factors that determine whether an individual
reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will
remain private."'
The Court thus had incorporated the centuries-old concept of curtilage into
Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine. Consequently, because a person
reasonably could expect privacy in his or her curtilage, identifying the boundaries of
curtilage took on constitutional significance. Providing a formula for determining
these boundaries fell to the Court in United States v. Dunn"4 when it offered a four-
part test:
[W]e believe that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular
reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage
to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding
the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps
112 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
1 Id. 180 (1984) (citations omitted).
114 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
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taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people
passing by." 5
Two factors in this test invite a return to viewing Fourth Amendment protection as
involving the crossing of tangible boundaries. Defining the outer limit of Fourth
Amendment protection, curtilage was to be identified, in part, by the "proximity" of
the area in question to the house." 6 This kind of distance measure seems
uncomfortably close to the "inches" analysis in Silverman. The second factor,
"whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home,""' 7 invites
taking this enclosure as the outer physical boundary of curtilage.
The Court's tendency toward tangible boundaries became even more apparent
with the advent of aerial surveillance. In California v. Ciraolo," 1 an officer flying
a fixed-wing plane at 1,000 feet made a naked eye observation of marijuana in the
defendant's curtilage." 9 Despite the fact that the government had made a visual
intrusion upon an individual's curtilage, the Court declined to find the officer's
activity amounted to a search, for the defendant's privacy expectation in his curtilage
was not one "society is prepared to honor."'20 This holding was no fluke. Three
years later, the Court confirmed its Ciraolo approach in Florida v. Riley,' in which
an officer made a naked-eye observation of contraband from a helicopter flying at
400 feet.' The Court's basis for the holding in Riley seemed to come out of a time
warp: "[T]he home and its curtilage are not necessarily protected from inspection that
involves no physical invasion."'2 In applying the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy standard, the Court undermined the very foundations of this rule by
articulating explicitly the physical invasion doctrine.
" Id. at 301. The Court did caution against treating this test as mathematically precise:
We do not suggest that combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula
that, when mechanically applied, yields a "correct" answer to all extent-of-
curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the
degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant
consideration-whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home
itself that it should be placed under the home's "umbrella" of Fourth Amendment
protection.
Id.
116 See id.
117 Id.
118 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
1 Seeid. at210.
120 Id. at 214.
121 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
122 See id. at 445.
"23 Id. at 449.
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B. The Warrant Requirement
1. The Court's General Presumption in Favor of Warrants
In structuring the Fourth Amendment, the Framers crafted a kind of political
Rorschach test that tended to reveal more about the judicial philosophies of the
Court's interpretations of the Amendment than it did about the original intent of the
founders. The Fourth Amendment consists of two clauses, each containing its own
restrictions on government action. The first clause, known as the Reasonableness
Clause,124 aims to control officialdom with a general principle: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... . 2" In contrast, the second clause,
referred to as the Warrant Clause, 26 focuses on details: "[N]o Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."' 27 The
Framers left the relationship between the Fourth Amendment's two mandates an
unsolvable mystery, for they merely connected the Amendment's two clauses with
an ambiguous "and."12
The Court thus has the unenviable task of determining whether the
reasonableness required by the Founders provides a yardstick of government legality
by itself or, instead, whether it is a standard given meaning only by the concrete
guidelines specifically delineated in the Warrant Clause. Without a clear signal from
the text, the Justices must apply their own valuation of the competing Fourth
Amendment interests of society and of the individual in their efforts to harmonize the
two clauses.'29
.24 See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of
Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REv. 383, 383 (1988).
125 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also Sundby, supra note 122, at 384 n.4.
126 See Sundby, supra note 122, at 384.
127 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See also Sundby, supra note 122, at 384 n.4.
128 See id.
129 Scott Sundby offered the following discussion of the Court's struggle to understand the
competing clauses' interrelationship:
Although the challenge of reconciling the warrant and reasonableness clauses
appears elementary, the Court's inability to meet the challenge is understandable
considering that the task goes to the very core of the amendment's meaning and
purpose. Reconciling the clauses requires balancing the citizenry's privacy
interest against the government's power to intrude in pursuing important
government objectives. If the Court assigns the warrant clause the greater role
in [F]ourth [A]mendment analysis, the warrant and probable cause requirements
will restrict the government's right to intrude. On the other hand, if the Court
primarily relies on a general reasonableness standard, the obstacles of obtaining
a warrant and proving probable cause are removed, and the scope of valid
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Historically, the Court has interpreted the Warrant Clause as the motivational
power of the Fourth Amendment which provides definition to reasonableness. At
mid-century, Justice Frankfurter explained the need for the Warrant Clause's tangible
tethers on government conduct:
To say that the search must be reasonable is to require some criterion of
reason. It is no guide at all ... to say that an "unreasonable search" is
forbidden-that the search must be reasonable. What is the test of reason
which makes a search reasonable? The test is the reason underlying and
expressed by the Fourth Amendment: the history and the experience
which it embodies and the safeguards afforded by it against the evils to
which it was a response. There must be a warrant to permit search,
barring only inherent limitations upon that requirement when there is a
good excuse for not getting a search warrant. 3
Such reasoning prompted the Court to accept unanimously as established fact a
general preference for warrants.
The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures; and
it is a cardinal principle that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.''. The Court has found the security specifically provided by the
Warrant Clause to be so crucial to individual privacy that it has articulated explicitly
the warrant preference as recently as 1994: "Where a search is undertaken by law
enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, this Court has
said that reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant."'3
government intrusions broadens. The two clauses thus strike different balances
between the citizenry's privacy interests and the government's police power, and
emphasizing one clause or the other will reflect the different balances. In many
ways, to decide how the two clauses interrelate is to determine the fourth
amendment's values and purposes.
Id (footnote omitted). For further consideration of the Court's difficulties in this arena, see
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757 (1994); and
Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1468 (1985).
30 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 83 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting),
overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Although this language was
contained in a dissenting opinion, portions of it were adopted later by a majority of the Court
in the seminal case involving search incident to arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 765 (1969) (quoting Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 83). Further, the Court had referred to a
warrant preference as early as 1925. See Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
31 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967)).
132 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
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The Warrant Clause thus has enjoyed center stage for nearly three-quarters of this
century.
2. The Reasonableness Alternative in Areas of "Special Needs"
The Warrant Clause's primacy was not established without challenge from
competing arguments favoring the Reasonableness Clause. Indeed, Justice
Frankfurter advanced his reasonableness view, as defined by the Warrant Clause, in
a dissenting opinion in United States v. Rabinowitz.' In Rabinowitz, the typically
disfavored view of reasonableness as a standard in its own right won the day:
It is appropriate to note that the Constitution does not say that the right of
the people to be secure in their persons should not be violated without a
search warrant if it is practicable for the officers to procure one. The
mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that the people shall be secure
against unreasonable searches.'34
However, the most dramatic victories on the reasonableness front occurred in a
series of cases perceived as so unique that the Court relegated them to the margins
of Fourth Amendment protection. These so-called special needs cases did not
involve the mainstay of Fourth Amendment litigation: law enforcement searches for
evidence in criminal investigations.' Instead, they concerned other government
interests such as the maintenance of safe housing in cities'36 and proper educational
environments in schools.'3 7 Because the government intrusions on individuals in
these cases did not fall within the typical ambit of criminal investigation, the Court
did not confine its reasoning to the traditional mandates of warrants and probable
cause.
'" 339 U.S. at 83 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969).
134 Id. at 65.
135 Justice Blackmun offered the following explanation for special needs balancing:
I believe that we have used such a balancing test, rather than strictly applying the
Fourth Amendment's Warrant and Probable-Cause Clause, only when we were
confronted with "a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility." Only
in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that
of the Framers.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 514 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
136 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
137 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325.
1999]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
A case that caught the Court in transition from emphasizing warrants to focusing
on reasonableness was Camara v. Municipal Court.' In this case, a San Francisco
housing inspector demanded entry into Camara's residence.'39 Camara refused
inspection without a search warrant, and the refusal ultimately resulted in his arrest
for failure to permit inspection under the city's housing code. 4 Camara argued that
he could not be convicted for refusing what amounted to an unconstitutional demand
for entry.41
The Court's opinion, authored by Justice White, began with the usual warrant
preference: "[E]xcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private
property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by
a valid search warrant."' 42 The Court then took great pains to explain that the Fourth
Amendment's application was not limited to criminal cases: "We may agree that a
routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile
intrusion than the typical policeman's search for the fruits and instrumentalities of
crime."'43 However, this fact did not cause the Court to suspend Fourth Amendment
application in non-criminal matters. The Court asserted: "It is surely anomalous to
say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth
Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." '44
Interestingly, in Camara, the Court went on to reject explicitly the reasoning that
the Court itself had crafted in an earlier case, Frank v. Maryland.' 4 In Frank, the
Court suggested that, because housing inspections were not directed at gathering
evidence of a crime, any Fourth Amendment interests at stake in such cases were
"merely 'peripheral.""' 41 Justice White disagreed and noted that, although the
inspection statute was not designed to gather evidence of crime, this regulatory law
was enforced by criminal sanctions. 41 Indeed, in that case, the government was
prosecuting Camara for the crime of refusal to permit entry of an inspector. 148 Justice
White found unconvincing the previous justifications, in Frank, for dispensing with
a warrant. He noted that the holding in Frank suggested that "these inspections are
'designed to make the least possible demand on the individual occupant"' and are
"hedged with safeguards," and that "the warrant process could not function
138 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
131 See id. at 526.
140 See id. at 527.
141 See id. at 525.
142 Id. at 528-29.
143' Id. at 530.
144 Id.
14' 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
146 Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
147 See id. at 531.
148 See id.
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effectively in this field."'49 Camara determined that such conclusions were based on
a misunderstanding of the purposes behind the warrant.'
The Court in Camara identified a variety of functions served by warrants: They
inform citizens of the laws justifying official intrusion, the lawful limits of the search,
and the authority of the person seeking entry.' Without such authorization from a
neutral magistrate, the "official in the field" would have the discretion to intrude
upon a citizen who was unaware of his privacy rights.'52 Justice White condemned
this as "precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently
circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to
search."'5 The Court's holding in Camara deemed warrants so vital that the
government assertion that "the public interest demands" warrantless searches as "the
only effective means" for carrying out the goal of housing inspections was subject to
"careful consideration."'5 4 The burden in this case remained with the government,
and its level of proof was indeed high: The state had to establish that "the burden of
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search."'55
After reasserting the established doctrine of Warrant Clause primacy, the Court
then proceeded to undermine it in Camara. The Court altered the "probable cause"
needed to sustain a warrant in an administrative setting from an examination of
specific facts supporting a search of a particular place to a nebulous "reasonableness"
determination.'56 Reasonableness, in turn, deteriorated into a weighing process:
"Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than
by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails."' 57 In
the administrative warrant context, an entirely new kind of probable cause, one based
on balancing interests, was born.
Ironically, in the face of Justice White's language defending the sanctity of the
warrant requirement, Camara's administrative warrant ultimately opened the way for
"administrative searches" lacking any priorjudicial approval.' In this context, an
administrative search case of particular note is New York v. Burger.'9 In Burger,
officers entered to inspect an automobile junkyard without a warrant. 60 Justice
149 Id. at 531-32.
150 See id. at 532.
151 See id.
152 See id
113 Id. at 532-33.
114 Id. at 533.
... Id. (emphasis added).
156 See id. at 534-35.
17 Id. at 536-37.
.5. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987).
159 Id.
160 See id. at 694-95.
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Blackmun, who wrote the Court's opinion, determined that this junkyard constituted
a "closely regulated" industry. ' Traditionally, this label was given only to "[c]ertain
industries" which had "such a history of government oversight that no reasonable
expectation of privacy could exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an
enterprise."' 62 The liquor industry presented an example of a business experiencing
this "long tradition of close government supervision."' 63 Over time, however, the
Court de-emphasized the length-of-oversight requirement, focusing instead on "the
pervasiveness and regularity of the... regulation.""
Whether the label is "closely" or "pervasively" regulated, its significance is
certain, for once a business is so categorized, its owners lose not only the right to
traditional probable cause, but to any warrant whatsoever:
Because the owner or operator of commercial premises in a "closely
regulated" industry has a reduced expectation of privacy, the warrant and
probable-cause requirements, which fulfill the traditional Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness for a government search have
lessened application in this context. Rather, we conclude that,, as in other
situations of "special need," where the privacy interests of the owner are
weakened and the government interests in regulating particular businesses
are concomitantly heightened, a warrantless inspection of commercial
premises may well be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 6 '
Another pioneer case in the substitution of reasonableness balancing for the
Warrant Clause's fundamentals was New Jersey v. TL.O. '66 The Court in TL.O.
considered the validity of a school official's recovery of marijuana from a student's
purse. 67 The school administrator, Mr. Choplick, was not acting as a police officer
at the time of his search: Instead, he ventured into the student's purse for cigarettes
161 Id. at 707. These enterprises also have been called, "pervasively regulated
business[es]." Id. at 702.
162 Id. at 700 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978)).
163 Id.
"6 Id. at 701 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981)).
165 Id at 702 (citations omitted). Interestingly, the Court in Burger explicitly stated that
administrative searches were included in the "special needs" cases. See id (citing New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). As later cases indicate,
"special needs" became the preferred rubric.
'66 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
167 See id. at 327-28. Along with the marijuana in the student's purse, the school official,
Assistant Vice Principal Theodore Choplick, found cigarettes, rolling papers, a pipe, some
empty plastic bags, a "substantial quantity" of one-dollar bills, and various papers implicating
the student in marijuana dealing. See id. at 328.
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in order to enforce a school disciplinary rule prohibiting smoking in the girls'
bathroom. 6 ' The context of this search became crucial.
Although Justice White, writing for the Court, deemed an intrusion into a
student's purse "undoubtedly a severe violation of subjective expectations of
privacy," he also recognized the "substantial interest of teachers and administrators
in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds."' 69 This
governmental interest in "maintaining security and order in the schools," beyond the
run-of-the-mill needs of law enforcement, required "some easing of the restrictions
to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject."'7 ° The Court
endeavored to "strike the balance" between the interests of school and schoolchild. 7 '
In weighing the competing concerns, the Court in TL. 0. concluded that the "warrant
requirement, in particular, [was] unsuited to the school environment" and that the
"school setting also require[d] some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit
activity needed to justify a search."'7 The Court's holding in TL.O. was unabashed
in its abandonment of the Warrant Clause's requirements: "Where a careful
balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is
best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of
probable cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.' 73
Later special needs cases "stopped short" not only of probable cause, but also of
any degree of individualized suspicion. The Court, in Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n,174 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,175 and
Vernonia School District 47Jv. Acton,"' upheld warrantless searches based on no
individualized suspicion whatsoever. 77  Such reasonableness balancing was
particularly remarkable in light of the extreme level of government intrusion
involved; each of these cases concerned an activity traditionally accorded great
privacy: compelled urinalysis drug testing.'78
These cases, initially forming merely a "special needs" exception to the general
requirement for a warrant, were left unattended in a petri dish in the Court's Fourth
Amendment laboratory. The dangers of these holdings remained ignored over time,
168 See id. at 328.
169 Id, at 338-39.
170 Id. at 340.
17 See id.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 34 1.
174 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
175 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
176 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
177 See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995); Skinner v. Railway
Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 631 (1989); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989).
178 See Acton, 515 U.S. at 646; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 656.
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and special needs began to fester into an organism which threatened to take over the
Court's entire lab. In 1997, the Court aimed to stem the tide of special needs
contagion in Chandler v. Miller, a case in which candidates for state office were
compelled to provide urine samples for drug testing. 79 The majority's Chandler
opinion, however, failed to acknowledge openly the subjectivity of special needs,
choosing instead to exploit this doctrine's very malleability as an opportunity to
reinterpret its boundaries.' The Court's loss of resolve, in Chandler, to admit the
decades-long failure of its special needs experiment resulted not only in a missed
opportunity to return to the clarity of Fourth Amendment fundamentals; it marked the
point at which the language of special needs lost all credible meaning.
IV. THE HEARTBEAT DETECTOR'S POTENTIAL IMPACT ON
FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
A. Use of The Heartbeat Detector May Require a Reassessment of What Constitutes
a Fourth Amendment Search
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory's ESDS empowers the government to
intrude upon a person, quite literally, all the way to his or her heart. However,
whether Fourth Amendment reasonableness even covers such an invasion is far from
clear. Because the Amendment's protections extend only to searches and seizures,
heartbeat detection need only satisfy the reasonableness test if it falls within the
definition of either of these governmental activities.' 8' This issue, in turn, is affected
by which definition of a search the Court may choose to adopt in its assessment of
ESDS technology.
179 Chandler v. Miller, 117 S. Ct. 1295, 1296 (1997).
so Justice Ginsburg recognized special needs as an exception to Fourth Amendment
fundamentals, noting "When such 'special needs'--concerns other than crime detection-are
alleged in justification of a Fourth Amendment intrusion, courts must undertake a context-
specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private and public interests advanced by
the parties." Id. at 1301 (emphasis added). Moreover, when the special needs doctrine was
challenged as infringing on state sovereignty, the Court adamantly rejected the attack by
asserting, "Our guides remain Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia." Id. at 1303. For further
exploration of Chandler's special needs analysis, see George M. Dery III, Are Politicians
More Deserving of Privacy than Schoolchildren? How Chandler v. Miller Exposed the
Absurdities of Fourth Amendment "Special Needs" Balancing, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 73 (1998).
.8 This Article is limited to an analysis of the heartbeat detector within the Fourth
Amendment context. It, therefore, does not consider the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
implications of the use of this device. Further, as previously stated, this Article focuses on
the issue of an ESDS search rather than an ESDS seizure. See supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
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1. Heartbeat Detection Appears to Constitute a Fourth Amendment Search Under
Katz's "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Standard
At first blush, the privacy expectation a reasonable person holds in his or her own
heart seems to be beyond question. Certainly if a patdown of a pocket involves a
"severe . . intrusion upon cherished personal security,"' 2 and rummaging through
a closed purse is a "substantial invasion of privacy,"'8 3 probing the heart must
constitute a Fourth Amendment search. The Supreme Court has confirmed this logic
by finding that the recovery of blood coursing to the heart "plainly involves the
broadly conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment."'" 4
Indeed, the Court found this point was so obvious that no one reasonably could argue
against it."5
The Court has experienced no difficulty in extending Fourth Amendment
protection beyond the interior of an individual's person to that of his or her vehicle.
In Carroll v. United States," 6 the seminal case in which the Court crafted the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the Court determined that
recovering sixty-eight bottles of liquor from under seat upholstery constituted a
search."8 7 Further, in United States v. Ortiz,' the Court found that the physical
search for persons in the defendant's trunk amounted to a search. 9
Yet, the reasonableness of a person's privacy expectation from heartbeat
detection may not be as safely settled as these cases may indicate. If people simply
become accustomed to being scanned by heartbeat detectors, then any privacy
expectation, excluding the recognition of systems like ESDS, would be considered
unreasonable. Such circumstances seem to have moved beyond the hypothetical:
With the explicit purpose of encouraging "widespread application of this system,"
GeoVox Security, Inc. has obtained the license to market a commercial version of
ESDS."9° In theory, private corporations, which are not limited, as government
officials are, by the Constitution, could operate a heartbeat detector at any delivery
port, parking garage, theme park, or drive-in theater.. The societal erosion of this
privacy expectation thus would break ground for later government invasion.
182 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968).
183 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
184 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
185 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Schmerber, noted: "It could not reasonably
be argued, and indeed respondent does not argue, that the administration of the blood test in
this case was free of the constraints of the Fourth Amendment." Id
,86 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
817 See id. at 153.
188 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
189 See id. at 892.
190 See OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 1.
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Further, advocates of government employment of ESDS technology need not
wait for common commercial usage. One may sidestep the traditional logic of Katz
with a simple assertion: The Court should not analyze ESDS in the vacuum of
traditional reasonable expectation of privacy law. Instead, it should consider the
heartbeat detector in the light of refinements made in the cases of canine sniffs and
police overflights.
2. Heartbeat Detection Will Not Constitute a Fourth Amendment Search Under
Place's "Canine Sniff' Analysis
In deciding whether the Fourth Amendment even reaches heartbeat detectors, the
Court may choose to forgo entirely the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
standard, in favor of its canine sniff rule. The ESDS finally may be the "investigative
procedure" which causes trained dogs to no longer be sui generis in the surgical
nature of their intrusion on privacy. 9" The heartbeat detector is as limited as a canine
sniff both in its manner of obtaining facts and in the content of the information it
reveals. 9 While dogs spare a traveler from an officer's rummaging through the
contents of her luggage, the ESDS's seismic geophones may save a truck driver from
an eight-hour physical search by as many as six people.'93 Moreover, dogs and
heartbeat detectors share similarities in the content of the information they seek. A
canine hones in on "only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item," 94
while ESDS discloses only the presence or absence of a hidden person, who would
be present only for an illegal purpose whether at a nuclear facility, prison, border
checkpoint, or airport. Heartbeat detectors provide a search method even more
precise than canines, which suffer a twenty percent failure rate in detecting concealed
persons. 9 Thus, if canine searches escape Fourth Amendment regulation due to
their tailored accuracy, so should the even more limited and precise investigative
procedure presented in ESDS.
3. Heartbeat Detection Will Not Constitute a Fourth Amendment Search Under the
Recently Resurrected Physical Invasion Standard
A canine sniff has an additional aspect that the Supreme Court, at times, has
found quite appealing: It does not involve any physical intrusion on a constitutionally
protected area (as would an officer's actual rummaging through luggage). The Court
' See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
192 See id.
'9 See Kercel et al., supra note 1, at 4.
194 Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
"' Dogs are "about 80% reliable" in detecting hidden persons. See OAK RIDGE NATIONAL
LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 2.
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in Place discreetly omitted mention of this fact, perhaps because such reasoning
conflicted so jarringly with Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine. As
previously noted, however, by the time it considered aerial surveillance in the late
1980's, the Court seemed willing to return to the tangibility of the physical invasion
standard. '96
Under the old physical "trespass upon a constitutionally protected area"'197
doctrine which the Court seems ready to disinter, ESDS could dodge completely the
Fourth Amendment definition of a search. In fact, the operator may find it eery that
the heartbeat detector operates similarly to Goldman's "detectaphone."' 98 Both
devices operate while flush with a surface and collect waves generated by a person
on the other side of a barrier.'99 Because neither device creates the "physical
invasion" deemed crucial by the Court in Riley, neither should trigger a Fourth
Amendment search.2°
B. The Use of the Heartbeat Detector at Nuclear Facilities, Prisons, Border
Operations, andAirports Will Be Justified as Falling Within Special Needs
1. The Court Previously Has Identified a "Special Need" Beyond Law Enforcement
in Cases Focusing on Criminal Activity
As recently as 1994, the Court reaffirmed its general preference that police seek
warrants when investigating criminal wrongdoing.2' Due to the primacy of the
warrant requirement in criminal investigations, it may seem that use of ESDS
typically would require prior judicial authorization. After all, the heartbeat detector
is designed to alert law enforcement to the presence of criminals. People who
deliberately aim to create a "criticality event" which could kill "hundreds of
hostages" at nuclear weapons plants are brutal murderers.0 2 Persons who escape
'96 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,449 (1989) ("[T]he home and its curtilage are
not necessarily protected from inspection that involves no physical invasion.").
117 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
' See Goldman, 316 U.S. at 131-32.
9 See id; see also Strauss, supra note 10.
200 See Riley, 488 U.S. at 449.
201 The Acton, the Court noted: "Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement
officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, this Court has said that reasonableness
generally requires the obtaining of ajudicial warrant." Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 653 (1995). Certainly, among the most incriminating evidence at a criminal trial
for nuclear sabotage, prison escape, illegal immigration, or airline terrorism, is the very
presence of the defendant hidden in the sensitive area. Thus, the search for the dangerous
individuals in these cases is, at the same time, a search for incriminating evidence in any
future criminal case.
202 See OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 6.
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from prison are, by definition, convicted felons. Those who attempt to circumvent
the border checkpoints do so to avoid capture for violating our nation's immigration
laws. The individuals who try to smuggle weapons aboard airplanes are violent
terrorists.
Despite the obvious criminality of prison escapees, airline hijackers, and others
within the heartbeat detector's scrutiny, the Court may not choose to characterize the
dangers created by such persons as criminal in nature. This tendency is due to a
curious quirk in special needs analysis. Traditionally, if a legislature perceives a
particular behavior to be especially blameworthy and injurious to society, it will
define the act as criminal and punish its commission as a crime. Investigations of
such activity then typically trigger application of the relevant criminal rights. A
warrant under the Fourth Amendment supports the right to a search. As noted,
however, should the Court deem that a particular behavior creates a special kind of
harm to society outside of the criminal context, the fundamentals of warrants and
individualized suspicion may be balanced away in a "special needs" reasonableness
analysis. This idea promotes government effectiveness, for it allows officials to act
unfettered by Fourth Amendment limitations. The more dangerous the Court
perceives a harm, therefore, the more tempted it may be to provide the government
with the free rein inherent in special needs analysis. Such reasoning has created an
ironic twist in search and seizure law: The Court, when confronted with actions
possessing the most potential for peril to society, seeks to avoid the very label the
peoples' representatives have reserved for the most prohibited behavior, "crime.""2 3
Certainly, in the United States, possession and use of a controlled substance
without prescription is a crime.2"' Dealing of such a drug to others is an even more
serious offense.20 5 New sentencing enhancements target those who sell drugs at
school."l Furthermore, marijuana is listed in the grouping of drugs most susceptible
203 Justice White would have recognized that the current Court's special needs analysis
stands the Fourth Amendment on its head. As previously noted in the Camara discussion,
Justice White argued: "It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private
property are "fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected
of criminal behavior." Camara V. United States, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). Thanks to special
needs, this anomaly has become reality.
204 For example, California's Health and Safety Code § 11350(a) provides in part: "Except
as otherwise provided in this division, every person who possesses ... any controlled
substance.., unless upon the written prescription of a physician.., shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11350(a) (West 1998).
205 California's Health and Safety Code § 11352(a) provides in part: "Except as otherwise
provided in this division, every person who transports, imports into this state, sells ... any
controlled substances ... shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for three,
four, or five years." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11352(a) (West 1998).
206 California's Health and Safety Code § 11353.6(b) provides in part:
Any person 18 years of age or over who is convicted of a violation of Section
... 11352... where the violation takes place upon the grounds of, or within
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for abuse, the "Schedule I" substances? 7 The consideration of all of these facts
together would seem to point to the conclusion that the government should treat
marijuana sales at school as a crime. Mr. Theodore Choplick, the assistant vice
principal of the student in T.L.O., seemed to agree.2"' Upon discovering, in the
student's purse, marijuana and papers implicating her in drug sales, Choplick turned
this evidence over to police.20 9 Certainly, these illicit drugs and the incriminating
letters constituted key evidence in any criminal case pursued against her. The police
agreed with Mr. Choplick's view of the matter and took the case to juvenile court.2"0
The Supreme Court, however, took a different tack, citing the government's interest
in "maintaining security and order in the schools." '' By framing the case as one
involving a "need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place,"
rather than involving a typical crime, the Court freed itself from the traditional
warrant requirement and enabled itself to perform special needs balancing.212 In a
case involving drugs, which in some locales, have been calculated to account for
1,000 feet of, a public or private elementary, vocational, junior high, or high
school during hours that the school is open for classes ... shall receive an
additional punishment of 3, 4, or 5 years at the court's discretion.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11353.6(b) (West 1998).
207 Section 812 in Title 21 of the United States Code provides in part:
There are established five schedules of controlled substances, to be known as
schedules I, 1I, III, IV, and V....
(b)(1)Schedule I.-
(A) The drug or other substance has a high potential for abuse.
(B) The drug or other substance has no currently accepted medical use in
treatment in the United States.
(C) There is a lack of accepted safety for use of the drug or other substance
under medical supervision.
Schedule I .. .(c) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another
schedule ...
(10) Marihuana.
21 U.S.C. § 812 (1998).
208 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 330 (1985). The student and Mr. Choplick,
presumably residing in New Jersey, would be beyond the reach of the statutes. See supra text
accompanying notes 168-71. However, federal and state laws all are modeled upon the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1994).
209 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.
210 See id. at 329.
211 Id. at 340.
212 See id.
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some fifty percent of arrests, 23 the Court still was able to avoid the Fourth
Amendment fundamentals by pursuing a "special need. '1 4
Similar selective labeling occurred in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Ass 'n, a case upholding suspicionless drug urinalysis of railroad employees. 215 The
drug tests at issue in Skinner were meant to determine if various employees were
operating the railroads while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.1 6 Of course,
the actions of being under the influence of a controlled substance, driving while
impaired by alcohol or drugs, and causing either injury or death while driving under
the influence, readily fall within the definitions of criminal offenses.217 Further, the
"[e]xtraction of blood samples for testing is a highly effective means of determining
the degree to which a person is under the influence" 218 and, therefore, the gathering
of bodily fluids in Skinner resulted in access to highly probative evidence for any
subsequent criminal proceeding. Despite the criminal nature of the actions being
investigated and the evidence obtained by the tests, the Court characterized the case
as one merely involving the regulation of "conduct of railroad employees to ensure
safety. '2 9 Locating "'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement" provided the
justification to forgo meeting "the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements. 2 °
Perhaps the most glaring demonstration of the Court's avoidance of the "criminal
investigation" label occurred in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.22
Customs agents were required to submit to drug urinalysis to gain certain
promotions.222 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Von Raab majority, determined that
such testing prevented customs officials from being "the targets of bribery, 223 from
becoming actively complicit in the "importation of sizable drug shipments, 2 4 or
from blocking the "apprehension of dangerous criminals. 225 Also of concern was
213 One commentator has noted: "In many cities, half or more of the arrests are for drugs
or other crimes related to drug trafficking." Steven B. Duke, Drug Prohibition: An Unnatural
Disaster, 27 CONN. L. REV. 571, 579 (1995).2
.
4 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351.
215 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
216 See id. at 608-09.
217 See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11550 (West 1998) (Under the
Influence of a Controlled Substance); CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152 (West 1998) (Driving Under
the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs); CAL. PENAL CODE § 191.5 (West 1998) (Gross Vehicular
Manslaughter While Intoxicated).
21 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
219 Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 620.
220 Id.
221 489 U.S. 656 (1988).
222 See id. at 660-61.
223 Id. at 669.
224 Id. at 670.
225 Id.
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the effect drugs would have on officials who "may need to employ deadly force." '226
Von Raab therefore characterized the testing program as "not designed to serve the
ordinary needs of law enforcement." '227 This conclusion enabled the Court to subject
the Customs testing program to the balancing analysis.22 It is curious that the Court
would view bribery, drug importation, obstruction ofjustice, and improper discharge
of a firearm as implicating uniquely non-criminal concerns.
C. The Court Easily May Identify the Movement of Criminals Through Nuclear
Facilities, Prisons, Borders, and Airports as Threatening Societal Interests
Beyond Those of Law Enforcement
1. Illegal Entry into Nuclear Facilities Implicates Special Needs
Common sense decrees that if the government has a special need regarding any
activity, it is for the security of nuclear facilities. The DOE initially pursued ESDS
specifically for protecting government weapons plants against terrorists bent on
killing "hundreds of hostages," and electric utilities from eco-terrorists aiming to
contaminate the environment.229 Moreover, these interests may be said to be global.
Loss of control at a nuclear facility conceivably could undermine the non-
proliferation treaty or even ultimately trigger a nuclear exchange between nations.
The Court itself has recognized the magnitude of societal interest implicated by
nuclear facilities. In Skinner, the Court illustrated the compelling nature of the
government's need in rail safety by likening it to operations of nuclear plants:
Employees subject to the [urine] tests discharge duties fraught with such
risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have
disastrous consequences. Much like persons who have routine access to
dangerous nuclear power facilities ... employees who are subject to
testing under the FRA (Federal Railway Administration) regulations can
cause great human lOSS.
23 °
Just as a "momentary lapse" of attention to daily operations can spell disaster at
a nuclear plant, so too could a momentary lapse in the facility's security. At a
nuclear plant, failing to detect one person during a physical search of a truck could
endanger a community, the nation, or the globe.
226 Id. at 671.
227 Id. at 679.
228 See id.
229 See OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 6.
230 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628.
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The lower courts, which have addressed directly the perils of nuclear power,
clearly recognized the unique stakes involved in the protection of these facilities.
Judge Arnold, writing for the Circuit in Rushton v. Nebraska Public Power
District,"' described the nuclear plant's security measures in great detail:
The NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) maintains resident inspectors
at CNS (Cooper Nuclear Station) and periodically sends teams to review
the plant's security. Access to the plant is restricted. The protected area
of the plant is completely surrounded by a fence. To enter the protected
area, a person must go through explosive and metal detectors, and submit
to random pat downs by guards. Identification must be presented to the
guards, and a badge issued.232
The majority in Rushton then went on to uphold yet another security measure:
"preemployment, pretransfer, annual, and for-cause [urinalysis] testing" of plant
employees as part of a "Fitness for Duty Program." '233 The majority reached this
conclusion by heeding the Court's call in TL.O. to consider the context of the
government intrusion."' The situation presented in Rushton was the peril of a
nuclear disaster. Judge Arnold noted: "The potential for harm is vast" while the
intrusion on the employees has been limited by their choice to work in an industry
that is "heavily regulated.""23 The balance of facts thus weighed in the government's
favor because societal interests assumed biblical proportions while the employees
themselves had "significantly diminished" their own privacy expectations "by virtue
of working at CNS." 6 Therefore, the case fell "squarely within the administrative-
search exception," allowing suspicionless government testing.237
Rushton's reasoning echoed in another case involving drug testing at a nuclear
facility, Alverado v. Washington Public Power Supply.238 "[B]ecause of the sensitive
nature of the work," potential employees were "subject to security screening,
background investigation and psychological evaluation." '239 Writing for the court in
Alverado, Judge Utter determined that this regulatory scheme, along with nuclear
231 844 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1988).
232 See id at 563.
233 Id. at 564, 567.
234 The Rushton case cited the Court in TL. 0. for the assertion that: "Determination of the
reasonableness of a search depends on the context in which a search takes place, and requires
a balancing of the individual's legitimate expectation of privacy and personal security against
the government's need for the search." Id. at 566.
235 id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 566, 567.
238 759 P.2d 427 (1988).
239 Id at 428.
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power's potential for catastrophic consequences, placed the testing under the
"pervasively regulated industry" label."" This finding then opened the way to a
balancing of the competing concerns.24'
In weighing the interests of society against those of the individual in this
pervasively regulated industry, the court in Alverado found any individualized
suspicion requirement to be unworkable:
Because of the government's overriding interest in preventing any drug-
impaired employee from working in one of these vital areas, and the
difficulty in determining by mere visual observation whether a
prospective employee suffers from such impairment, routine drug testing
in the context of preemployment screening is virtually the only way in
which the operators of the WPPSS [nuclear] facility can effectively
monitor compliance.242
While individualized suspicion was impractical, a warrant was simply
unnecessary because the drug testing program itself possessed "constitutionally
adequate substitutes." 43 For instance, test subjects were given advanced warning,
allowed to provide a "nonwitnessed" urine sample in a medical setting, and
guaranteed confidentiality.244 Such precautions enabled the program designers to
dispense with the traditional Fourth Amendment safeguards.
This precedent seems to open the door to the implementation of ESDS at nuclear
facilities. If persons working in nuclear facilities already can be subjected to
psychological tests, explosive and metal detectors, random patdowns, and
suspicionless urine tests, certainly those who drive vehicles in and out of such plants
can suffer the smaller intrusion of having their trucks scanned for hidden heartbeats.
The balance of interests may be even more favorable to the government than in the
case of employee urinalysis. Certainly, the government's need is larger in the
circumstances in which ESDS would be used; terrorists intent on destroying life
arguably pose more danger than do impaired employees. As for ESDS's intrusion
on the individual, most people probably would opt to have the waves from within
their vehicles, or even from their hearts, measured rather than being required to void
into a cup. If individualized suspicion is not constitutionally mandated for the less
necessary and more invasive drug test, it should not be required for the heartbeat
detector. Regarding the warrant requirement, the heartbeat detector could provide
an adequate substitute for a warrant simply by the posting of warning signs and by
240 Id. at 433.
241 See id. at 433.
242 Id. at 436.
243 Id.
244 See id.
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limiting ESDS use to the vehicles that attempt to enter or exit the plant Alverado's
other safeguards, the nonwitnessed sampling, medical setting, and confidentiality,
target intrusions unique to urine testing and, therefore, are inapplicable to ESDS.
2. Escapes From Prison Implicate Special Needs
Escaping from prison is a criminal offense independent of that for which an
inmate is already serving time."' When authorities search with spotlights or dogs,
alert the community that an escapee is at large, or check the homes of an escapee's
family or friends, however, their primary goal is arguably the recovery of the escapee.
If officials desire to conduct an investigation to collect evidence of the escape, the
best evidence probably will be back at the institution itself. In fact, the most obvious
evidence of escape is the very absence of the prisoner from the facility. One may
argue, therefore, that when a convict is at large, the government uses resources to
promote a special need beyond that of law enforcement, the safety of the surrounding
populace from a potentially desperate and dangerous individual. 246 Even more
importantly for the purposes of ESDS, the heartbeat detector would be used to
prevent escape and the resulting peril to the community in the first place.247 In this
sense, ESDS is more analogous to guards posted at the perimeter, cameras, lights, or
even the prison's walls than it is to bloodhounds tracking down a fugitive.
Clearly, in a situation in which officials intend to maintain the status quo of
keeping inmates in prison, probable cause or any individualized suspicion
requirement of a prisoner who already has escaped-or a warrant with information
supporting such a requirement-would be unworkable. With prisons, like airports,
the people who will be intruded upon (the drivers of support vehicles) will be the
245 See Section 751 in Title 18 of the United States Code which provides in part:
Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the Attorney General
or his authorized representative, or from any institution or facility in which he
is confined by direction of the Attorney General, or from any custody under or
by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States by any court,
judge, or commissioner, or from the custody of an officer or employee of the
United States pursuant to lawful arrest, shall, if the custody or confinement is by
virtue of an arrest on a charge of felony, or conviction of any offense, be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 751 (1994).
246 Moreover, the considerable resources needed to capture an escapee create special
needs of their own. The typical monetary cost for each prison escape has been estimated at
$100,000. See OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 5. "Some prison
authorities place the estimated cost at nearer $250K." Id. The aggregate cost of escapes by
prisoners hiding in outgoing support vehicles, when it is estimated that "an average of one
successful escape per year per prison uses this ploy," must be enormous. Id.
247 See id.
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"immediate beneficiaries of the screening system [because] security precautions
increase the likelihood of safe arrival at their chosen destination."248
3. Smuggling Undocumented Aliens Implicates Special Needs
Supreme Court precedent has established firmly the special needs the
government possesses in checking illegal immigration at interior checkpoints. The
majority of the Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte offered this summary:
Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance of a traffic-
checking program in the interior is necessary because the flow of illegal
aliens cannot be controlled effectively at the border. We note here only
the substantiality of the public interest in the practice of routine stops for
inquiry at permanent checkpoints, a practice which the Government
identifies as the most important of the traffic-checking operations. These
checkpoints are located on important highways; in their absence such
highways would offer illegal aliens a quick and safe route into the
interior. Routine checkpoint inquiries apprehend many smugglers and
illegal aliens who succumb to the lure of such highways. And the
prospect of such inquiries forces others onto less efficient roads that are
less heavily traveled, slowing their movement and making them more
vulnerable to detection by roving patrols.249
The Court thus identified permanent immigration checkpoints as creating a
"particular context" in which the Court should "weigh[] the public interest against
the Fourth Amendment interest of the individual."25 Again, special needs balancing
freed the Court to focus on the practicality of maintaining Fourth Amendment
fundamentals."M In this weighing process, the Court found the government interest
in making routine checkpoint stops to be great, while it viewed the resulting intrusion
on the individual as quite limited. The intrusion involved "only a brief detention" of
motorists, during which "'[a]ll that is required of the vehicle's occupants is a
248 People v. Hyde, 524 P.2d 830, 835 (1974).
249 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-57 (1976).
250 Id. at 555.
251 The Court asserted:
A requirement that stops on major routes inland always be based on reasonable
suspicion would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy
to allow the particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be
identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement
would largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of well-disguised smuggling
operations, even though smugglers are known to use these highways regularly.
Id. at 557.
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response to a brief question or two and possibly the production of a document
evidencing a right to be in the United States."' 252 Writing for the majority, Justice
Powell considered government checkpoint activity so limited that he even deemed
the "objective intrusion" occasioned by the selective referrals of certain drivers to a
"secondary inspection area" as only "minimal." 3 The balancing of interests required
by the holding in Martinez-Fuerte reduced the official action at issue to nothing more
than "the stop itself, the questioning, and the visual inspection." '254
The Court felt little was needed to justify such a small annoyance. Even the
lowest standard ofjustification, "reasonable suspicion," was deemed "impractical."255
In response to the defendants' plea that at least "some quantum of individualized
suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure," '256 Justice
Powell intoned, "[T]he Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of
such suspicion." '257 Without a requirement of individualized suspicion, a warrant
establishing facts supporting it would be an empty act. Thus, it logically was
inevitable that the Court would go on to decide that "a warrant requirement here
would make little contribution." 8 Justice Powell bolstered his abandonment of the
warrant mandate by arguing "that the visible manifestations of the field officers'
authority at a checkpoint provide substantially the same assurances in this case." '259
In light of Martinez-Fuerte, use of the heartbeat detector at checkpoints should
receive relatively easy acceptance by the Court. ESDS would create no additional
unconstitutional invasion on a vehicle's occupants than would the typical checkpoint
inquiry stop. In both situations, motorists would be detained and briefly questioned
at a secondary inspection area.
The heartbeat detector would necessitate the additional intrusion of ordering the
known occupants to exit the vehicle during the administration of the heartbeat test.
Recent case law has indicated, however, that such official activity is reasonable. In
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Court determined that the "incremental intrusion
resulting from the request [to the driver] to get out of the car once the vehicle was
lawfully stopped" required no additional justification.2" Further, the Court expanded
an officer's order-out authority with its holding in Maryland v. Wilson that "an
officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending
completion of the stop."26' Like motorists stopped for traffic tickets, drivers detained
252 Id. at 558 (quoting Unites States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975)).
253 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560.
254 Id. at 558.
255 Id. at 557.
256 Id. at 560.
257 Id. at 561.
258 Id. at 565.
259 id.
260 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977).
261 Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997).
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at checkpoints are seized legally by the government. Again, like the ticketed
motorist, for people stopped at checkpoints, "[t]he only change in their circumstances
which will result from ordering them out of the car is that they will be outside of,
rather than inside of, the stopped car." '262 Further, pairing officers in teams of two
could minimize any inconvenience stemming from the actual testing procedure. One
officer could ask the occupants out of the vehicle and perform the traditional brief
inquiry and document review, while the other officer places the heartbeat detector on
the hood of the car. Because the actual test could be completed in "less than two
minutes," locating hidden heartbeats conceivably could be accomplished before
completion of the standard inquiry of the known occupants.263
One wrench can be thrown into the works of this smoothly functioning analysis.
The holding of Martinez-Fuerte involved only stops and questions, not searches.
The majority made a clear distinction between the limited "type of stops described
in this opinion" and the more intrusive official action of a search of an automobile,
which could be justified only by "consent or probable cause."2 The Court's
characterization of ESDS again becomes pivotal; should the Court apply the
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis from Katz in a straightforward manner,
heartbeat detection should constitute a search. Ifthe Court analogizes ESDS with the
canine sniff, or if it determines the lack of physical invasion to be a decisive factor
as it did in Riley, however, then the Fourth Amendment would not even reach the
government's collection of heartbeat waves.
4. Airplane Safety Implicates Special Needs
The special needs that society possesses in air travel tragically are evident
whenever an accident that causes injury or loss of life occurs. For decades, in an
effort to address the threat to air safety presented by hijackers, technicians have
installed magnetometers in airports to scan each passenger for the presence of
metallic weapons. It has long been established that this procedure constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment. For instance, the California Supreme Court,
in People v. Hyde, opined: "The magnetometer, though minimally intrusive,
unquestionably operates to search individuals within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment: the machine reveals the presence of metal objects in areas under
personal control as to which the individual maintains a reasonable expectation of
privacy and freedom from governmental inspection." '265
The majority of the court in Hyde, however, considered such a search to fall
within Camara's "administrative search" exception to traditional Fourth Amendment
262 id.
263 See OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, supra note 5, at 5.
264 Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 567.
265 People v. Hyde, 524 P.2d 830, 833 (1974).
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analysis. 2  The court noted that "the essential purpose of the anti-hijacking system
established by the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) is not to ferret out
contraband or to preserve for trial evidence of criminal activity." '267 Instead, the
magnetometer screening was a "central phase of a comprehensive regulatory program
designed to insure that dangerous weapons will not be carried onto an airplane and
to deter potential hijackers from attempting to board."26
Because the airport magnetometer was not being used for traditional criminal
investigations, the reasonableness of its use was to be determined by balancing the
competing interests.269 The majority viewed the government's interests in hijacking
prevention as "substantial":
Air piracy offers a unique opportunity for the political terrorist, the
extortionist, or the mentally disturbed to command attention by placing
in jeopardy the lives of passengers and crew, as well as private property
worth millions of dollars. Hijackings constitute a significant threat to the
orderly operation of air commerce and to the stability of international
relations.270
In contrast to the "gravity" of the governmental concern, the passenger's interest
in avoiding the magnetometer is minimal. Indeed, most passengers would "welcome
routine inspection" for they are the "immediate beneficiaries of the screening system;
security precautions increase the likelihood of safe arrival at their chosen
destination."27'
Special needs balancing deemed the traditional Fourth Amendment safeguard of
individualized suspicion unsuited in the airport context for, like the "area
inspections" in Camara, "it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would
achieve acceptable results. '272 Similarly, the warrant procedure was a bad fit for the
magnetometer because: "Every day through airport terminals. nationwide pass
thousands of airline travellers, each of whom must be screened for weapons or
explosives. The result is a form of ongoing emergency rendering it impracticable,
if not impossible, for airline officials to seek a search warrant for individual
passengers." '273
266 See id. at 834-35.
267 Id. at 834.
268 id.
269 See id. at 835.
270 Id.
271 id.
272 Id. at 835-36.
273 Id at 836. The majority predicted that any warrant requirement for airport screenings
would create "unacceptable delays" in boarding, or "pro forma warrant[s]." Id. at 837.
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If the use of magnetometers on thousands of innocent passengers is
constitutionally reasonable, then the use of ESDS on hundreds of support vehicles
also must satisfy the Fourth Amendment. After all, the danger of a terrorist entering
an aircraft from the back door used by supply vehicles is just as great as that posed
by a terrorist coming through the front door with passengers. Further, the impact of
ESDS and magnetometers on individual interests can be equated roughly. One may
argue that neither technology is focused on gathering evidence of criminal activity.
Instead, both are meant to screen quickly all who pass through for particular
prohibited items: metal weapons or the hearts of hidden terrorists. In fact, those
subjected to each technology would probably embrace it: Airline passengers and
support crews probably would be happy to avoid being in the presence of terrorists.
Both the magnetometer and the heartbeat detector must operate on the "area
inspection" principle; to work effectively, all must be scanned. The same arguments
advanced by the court in Hyde in allowing the magnetometer to search without any
individualized suspicion or warrant must be equally valid for ESDS at airports. Just
as a requirement mandating the formation of individualized suspicion that one
individual is hiding a gun under his jacket would undermine the effectiveness of the
magnetometer's ability to identify or deter dangerous persons, so too would a
requirement that ESDS be premised on individualized suspicion that a particular
vehicle held a hidden individual. Likewise, if a warrant would cause either
unacceptable delays or the generation of "pro forma" documents in the screening of
passengers, it would cause the same problems with the screening of support
vehicles.274
V. THE USE OF THE HEARTBEAT DETECTOR IMPLICATES ISSUES USUALLY
RESERVED FOR SEVERE BODILY INTRUSIONS
ESDS is a technological marvel. It promotes the interests of both society and the
individual by enabling the government to protect sensitive sites with a tool that
operates with unsurpassed accuracy and brevity. However, all the wonders of this
new technology cannot erase one crucial fact; this device intrudes beyond the interior
of vehicles and into our hearts. The heartbeat detector obtains information from deep
within our bodies and measures a function that is beyond our volitional control. Due
to the very purpose of the heart, we cannot avoid detection by choosing to stop the
beating of this organ.
The Court previously has had to confront the Fourth Amendment implications
of a severe bodily intrusion, albeit not one which invaded all the way to the heart.
In Winston v. Lee,27 the Court considered the reasonableness of a government
request to perform surgery, against a defendant's will, in order to recover a bullet
274 See id. at 837.
275 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
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lodged somewhere in the left chest area. 6 Rudolph Lee had received the bullet
wound during his attempt to rob an armed shopkeeper.277 The government moved
the courts to allow it to have Lee placed under general anesthesia to remove
surgically the bullet for ballistics examination.27 Justice Brennan, who wrote the
Court's opinion, began his analysis by noting that the Fourth Amendment generally
protects the individual from "official intrusions up to the point where the
community's need for evidence surmounts a specified standard, ordinarily 'probable
cause.'"" Once this factual threshold is reached, it ordinarily is reasonable "to
demand that the individual give up some part of his interest in privacy and security
to advance the community's vital interests in law enforcement.280
Justice Brennan found the "compelled surgical intrusion" to be an invasion of a
different order though, because it implicated "expectations of privacy and security
of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to produce
evidence of a crime., 281' The surgical intrusion in Winston v. Lee differed in several
particulars from that involved with the heartbeat detector. The invasion of Lee would
have involved the forced drugging of a citizen, and could have necessitated
"'extensive probing and retracting of the muscle tissue' carrying with it 'the
concomitant risks of injury to the muscle as well as injury to the nerves, blood vessels
and other tissue in the chest and pleural cavity.' 212 In contrast, the use of ESDS,
relying on the passive collection of seismic waves, would involve no such drugging,
cutting, or injury.
The Court in Winston v. Lee identified an individual interest in the bodily
intrusion context that has particular relevance in the analysis of ESDS: the "dignity"
of the individual.283 Indeed, the invasion of a citizen's body was of vital importance
to the Court's analysis: "Because we are dealing with intrusions into the human body
rather than with state interferences with property relationships or private
papers-'houses, papers, and effects'-we write on a clean slate. 284 Government
intrusion into a person's own body triggers the "most personal and deep-rooted
expectations of privacy" requiring a "discerning" case-by-case inquiry.2 5 Thus, in
bodily intrusion cases, in which the individual possesses a "significantly heightened
privacy interest," the government must provide "a more substantial justification" to
276 See id. at 755-56.
277 See id.
278 See id. at 755, 765.
279 Id. at 759.
280 Id.
281 id.
282 Id. at 764.
283 Justice Brennan noted: "The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State." Id at 760.
284 Id. (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966)).
211 Id. at 760.
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prove the search reasonable." 6 Far from the special needs case law allowing certain
suspicionless intrusions upon the individual, therefore, the Winston v. Lee holding
would mandate a level of justification even higher than traditional probable cause
when probing the human heart. Any special needs analysis omitting consideration
of ESDS's uniquely powerful ability to probe hearts could cause the Court to stray
far from the protections it deliberately established for cases involving government
intrusions into the body.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Edgar Allan Poe's short story, "The Tell-Tale Heart," a killer imagined police
could hear the heartbeat of his victim who was hidden beneath their feet.2" 7 Of
course, the clue that led police to the body was the narrator's own guilt, rather than
any sound from a heart that had ceased to beat."88 One and a half centuries later,
technology has crafted a curious mirror image of Poe's theme. Whether average
citizens today are aware, ESDS enables police to sense our beating hearts simply by
attaching an inexpensive device to the outer surfaces of our vehicles.
This advance in technology, like the advances before it,"' may force the Court
to reassess its various definitions of a Fourth Amendment search. The Court in Katz
286 Id. at 767.
287 Edgar Allan Poe, "The Tell-Tale Heart," in TALES OF MYSTERY & IMAGINATION 255
(1966). Poe wrote:
The ringing became more distinct:-it continued and became more
distinct ... it continued and gained definitiveness-until, at length, I found that
the noise was not within my ears.
No doubt I now grew very pale;-but I talked more fluently, and with a
heightened voice. Yet the sound increased-and what could I do? It was a low
dull, quick sound-much such a sound as a watch makes when enveloped in
cotton .... Oh God! what could I do? I foamed-I raved-I swore! I swung the
chair upon which I had been sitting, and grated it upon the boards, but the noise
arose over all and continually increased . . . And still the men chatted
pleasantly, and smiled. Was it possible they heard not? Almighty God!-no, no!
They heard!--they suspected!-they knew!--they were making a mockery of my
horror!
Id. at 259. Others have noted the connection to Poe. See The Tell-Tale Heart: Detector Picks
Up Hearbeat of Hidden Humans, supra note 3.
288 "'Villains!' I shrieked, 'dissemble no more! I admit the deed!-tear up the
planks!-here, here!-it is the beating of his hideous heart!' Poe, supra note 287.
289 For examples of the Court's consideration of the scope of a Fourth Amendment search
in light of new technology, see Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986)
(high precision aerial photography); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1978) (pen registers);
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1941) (bugging); and Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1927) (wiretapping).
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declared that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."2  To give
meaning to this mandate, the Court must shield Katz's "reasonable expectation of
privacy" search definition from the continually corrosive forces of technological
developments and intrusions by commercial concerns. Perhaps the Court should
consider distinguishing between privacy intrusions by government actors and those
in the private or commercial sphere. Simply because a business concern such as
GeoVox Security, Inc. makes a particular intrusion common does not mean that the
government simply may follow suit without even triggering Fourth Amendment
application. Inspection of an individual by a corporation (however unsettling a
prospect this may be) does not equate with a probe by the government which
possesses the resources of the state to prosecute and punish. Moreover, the Court
itself must apply Katz's formula consistently to every case. The justices should not
be tempted to apply a less demanding standard when faced with a surgically precise
investigation technique... or an observation made without physical penetration of
premises."'
Further, the Court must place meaningful limits on its special needs precedent.
This case law has wandered dangerously far from its origins. The first decisions
attempted to remain faithful to at least somb of the Fourth Amendment fundamentals;
the Court in Camara recognized that criminal consequences may exist even in
administrative matters and, therefore, demanded government intrusions be cleared
previously by neutral magistrates. 93 The TL.O. majority viewed a school
administrator's foray into a student's purse as a "severe violation of subjective
expectations of privacy" and thus premised the official conduct on individualized
suspicion.'94 Justice White, the author of both the Camara and TL.O. opinions
would be hard pressed to recognize the special needs doctrine in later case law such
as that in Acton.295 By the time the Court considered urinalysis testing of students,
it had become familiar with abandoning both the warrant and individualized
suspicion requirements.
A return, at least to the half-measures taken in Camara, would not only be
desirable but quite feasible. If the government is able to establish reasonableness for
an issuing judge for the ever-roving housing inspectors, certainly it could establish
the reasonableness of government intrusions at the fixed locations of nuclear
facilities, prisons, border checkpoints, and airports for a magistrate. Judicial pre-
approval could ensure clear guidelines for government heartbeat detentions and
advise drivers of the need for the invasions.
290 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
29 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1982).
292 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989).
293 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 53-1, 534 (1967).
294 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985).
295 See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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The alternative to a reassertion of Fourth Amendment fundamentals in analyzing
heartbeat detection would be protection against unreasonable searches in name only.
The current Court, by trimming continually the Amendment's scope, and by
measuring creatively the competing interests in special needs cases, has established
areas of government behavior which are virtually immune to constitutional constraint.
Should the Court fail to shore up Fourth Amendment requirements, its answer to
anyone seeking protection from government invasions of the deepest regions of their
bodies simply may be: "If you wish to avoid detection, then stop your heart from
beating."
